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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
EDDIE BUSTOS, ] 
Defendant. ] 
Case No. 20090079 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for two counts of Automobile 
Homicide, a second-degree felony in violation of §76-5-207 and one count of 
Failure to Stop at the Command of a Police Officer, a second-degree felony in 
violation of §41-6A-210. This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 
U.C.A. §78-2a-3(2)G). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN NOT MERGING THE 
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP 
CHARGE WITH THE AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE 
CHARGE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MERGER 
DOCTRINE? 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The Court should review the merger doctrine under 
a statutory interpretation standard. Reviewing whether the merger doctrine 
applies is "a matter of statutory interpretation, a legal question, which we review 
for correctness." State v. Bluff. 2002 UT 66; 52 P.3d 1210. This issue is preserved 
for appeal by Defendant's timely motion to apply the merger doctrine presented 
during the sentencing phase of the trial. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
§41-6a-210. Failure to respond to officer's signal to stop — Fleeing — 
Causing property damage or bodily injury — Suspension of driver's license -
- Forfeiture of vehicle — Penalties 
(1) (a) An operator who receives a visual or audible signal from a peace 
officer to bring the vehicle to a stop may not: 
(i) operate the vehicle in willful or wanton disregard of the signal so as to 
interfere with or endanger the operation of any vehicle or person; or 
(ii) attempt to flee or elude a peace officer by vehicle or other means. 
(b) (i) A person who violates Subsection (l)(a) is guilty of a felony of the 
third degree. 
(ii) The court shall, as part of any sentence under this Subsection (1), 
impose a fine of not less than $ 1,000. 
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(2) (a) An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes 
death or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not 
amounting to murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second 
degree. 
(b) The court shall, as part of any sentence under this Subsection (2), impose 
a fine of not less than $ 5,000. 
(3) (a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other 
section, a person who violates Subsection (l)(a) or (2)(a) shall have the 
person's driver license revoked under Subsection 53-3-220(1 )(a)(ix) for a 
period of one year. 
(b) (i) The court shall forward the report of the conviction to the division. 
(ii) If the person is the holder of a driver license from another jurisdiction, 
the division shall notify the appropriate officials in the licensing state. 
§76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal episode — 
Included offenses 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal 
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall 
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the defendant 
is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
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(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. 
An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to 
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included 
offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the 
offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate court 
on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily 
found eveiy fact required for conviction of that included offense, the verdict or 
judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction 
entered for the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if such relief is 
sought by the defendant. 
§76-2-103. Definitions 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
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(3) Recklessly with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result 
of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation 
from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought 
to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to 
perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's 
standpoint. 
§76-5-207. Automobile homicide 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Drug" or "drugs" means: 
(i) a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2; 
(ii) a drug as defined in Section 58-17b-102; or 
(iii) any substance that, when knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly taken 
into the human body, can impair the ability of a person to safely operate a motor 
vehicle. 
(b) "Motor vehicle" means any self-propelled vehicle and includes any 
automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft. 
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the 
person operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of 
another and: 
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(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows 
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
time of operation. 
(b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree felony 
if it is subsequent to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2). 
(c) As used in this Subsection (2), "negligent" means simple negligence, the 
failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons 
exercise under like or similar circumstances. 
(3) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the 
person operates a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the 
death of another and: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows 
that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater 
at the time of the test; 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of 
alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle; or 
(iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater at the 
time of operation. 
(b) As used in this Subsection (3), "criminally negligent" means criminal 
negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4). 
(4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6a-515 
and the provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by 
Section 41-6a-516 apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content 
under this section. 
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(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall 
be made in accordance with Subsection 41-6a-502(l). 
(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally 
entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense. 
(7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is 
admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution. 
(8) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering bodily injury 
or serious bodily injury as a result of the person's violation of Section 41-6a-502 
or death as a result of the person's violation of this section whether or not the 
injuries arise from the same episode of driving. 
§78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative 
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court 
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except 
the Public Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and 
Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, 
Fire and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of 
the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and 
Mining, and the state engineer; 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was charged by information with one count of Failure to 
Respond to an officer's signal to stop resulting injury or death, a second-degree 
felony; and two counts of criminal homicide, automobile homicide, a second 
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degree felony. (R. 3) The Defendant was tried before a jury on March 28 and 29, 
2007, empanelled by the Honorable Pamela G. Heffernan. The jury found the 
Defendant guilty of all charges. On May 8, 2007, the Defendant was sentenced on 
the automobile homicide counts to serve concurrent terms of one to fifteen years 
at the Utah State Prison. Subsequently, the Defendant was sentenced on the 
Failure to Respond count to serve one to fifteen years, consecutively to the other 
counts. The Defendant is currently serving this term at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Defendant was charged with two counts of automobile homicide and 
one count of failure to stop for a police officer, resulting in injury or death. (R.3) 
The Defendant stopped at the house a friend in the early morning of December 
15, 2005(R. 280/104) The police just happened to be watching that house in the 
course of an investigation not involving the Defendant. (R.280/106) The 
Defendant stopped in front of the house in a white 1991 Chevrolet Beretta. (R. 
280/106) Officer Jones, the officer watching to house, witnessed the Beretta stop 
at the house; and it became an object of interest to the police. While searching 
on his computer to find the Defendant's registration information, the white 
Beretta began going backward down the street toward Officer Jones. (R. 280/107) 
The Defendant was driving in the opposite lane of traffic and in the middle of the 
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street, and Defendant eventually drove past Officer Jones, forcing him to the side 
of the road. (R. 280/112) Officer Jones testified that, "After he ran me off the 
road, he was just going slow and staring straight ahead. I thought was a very 
strange reaction. Most people that just ran somebody off the road is gonna be 
worried. But he just continued driving, staring straight ahead, acting like I wasn't 
even there." (R. 280/115) 
Officer Jones eventually pulled behind the Defendant and activated his 
overhead lights, but the Defendant did not respond. (R. 280/118) Eventually 
Officer Jones activated his siren, and the Defendant started to accelerate R. 
280/120) and was speeding down the street, through intersections, red lights, and 
on the wrong side of the street. (R. 280/120-125) Officer Jones was told by his 
sergeant to discontinue the chase due to safety reasons between 26 and 27 
Streets. (R.280/126) The Defendant continued driving at a high rate of speed, 
rand through a red light at the intersection at 24th Street and collided with a car 
resulting in the death of two individuals. (R. 280/131) The jury convicted the 
Defendant of all charges. After the jury verdict, the Defendant filed a motion to 
arrest judgment making two claims: first, that there was insufficient evidence; and 
second, that based upon the merger doctrine, charge of failure to respond to a 
police officer should have been merged with the two automobile homicide 
9 
charges.(R. 205-213) The trial court, after having read the brief and hearing oral 
arguments, denied the motion. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The principal issue on appeal is the Defendant was convicted of two 
charges that are separate in name but practically identical in the elements. The 
trial court committed error by not merging the two charges at the Defendant's 
request. The charge of Failure to Stop for an officer's signal, §41-6a-210(2)(a), 
reads, "An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death 
or serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amounting to 
murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felo»ny of the second degree." The 
charge of Automobile Homicide, §76-5-207(3)(a), reads, "Criminal homicide is 
automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person operates a motor 
vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another..." The 
only other element added to the automobile homicide statute is that the person 
charged must have ingested an unsafe amount of alcohol or drugs. Utah Code 
§76-1-402(3) reads: 
A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the 
offense charged but may not be convicted of both the offense 
charged and the included offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged. 
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To convict an individual for the charge of Failure to Stop for a Police 
Signal, the State is required to prove that an individual received a signal to stop 
and operated his vehicle in a willful and wanton disregard of the signal, thereby 
endangering the operation of any vehicle or person together with the death or 
serious bodily injury of another person. Those two elements in essence are 
identical to the elements of an Automobile Homicide charge. The only difference 
between the two charges is that Automobile Homicide has an element where 
alcohol or drugs must be ingested. The provision in the Failure to Stop charge is 
included in the elements of Automobile Homicide and therefore should be 
merged. 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT MERGING THE 
FAILURE TO RESPOND TO OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP 
CHARGE WITH THE AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE CHARGE 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE MERGER DOCTRINE. 
Utah Code §76-1-402 codifies the merger doctrine that "protects criminal 
defendants from being twice punished for committing a single act that may violate 
more than one criminal statute." State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, 122 P.3d 153. Under 
§76-1-402, an offense meets the criteria as a lesser included offense when the 
crime is "is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged." Id. §76-1-402(3 )(a). 
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The general rule involved in this doctrine is that if all of the elements of the 
lesser included offense are contained within the higher offense, the merger 
doctrine requires the dismissal of the lesser offense. In applying that doctrine to 
the two offenses in the present case, in a side by side comparison, we find as 
follows: 
Automobile Homicide 
(1) Operates a motor vehicle in a 
criminally negligent manner, 
(2) Causes the death of another: and 
Failure to respond to Officers Signal 
(1) Operates a vehicle in willful or 
wanton disregard of the signal so as to 
...endanger the operation of any vehicle 
or person; 
(2) Causes death or serious bodily 
injury to another person. 
(3) The defendant was under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs to the extent 
that his driving was impaired. 
The facts established in the present case to convict the Defendant of 
automobile homicide were covered entirely under the failure to respond to an 
officer's signal to stop felony conviction. In order to establish automobile 
homicide the State is required to prove that the Defendant was driving in a 
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reckless or criminally negligent manner . In the present case, this was established 
by the Defendant driving at a high rate of speed and running a red light in an 
attempt to elude a police officer. Finally, the State is required to prove that the 
Defendant killed an individual as a direct and proximate result of this criminally 
negligent driving pattern. 
The only difference between the two statutes, as established in the case at 
bar, is the fact that the criminal homicide statute requires that the Defendant be 
under the influence of drugs or alcohol. Since that would be higher offense, the 
Defendant should have been convicted of the automobile homicide, and the 
failure to stop charge should be dismissed under the merger doctrine. 
The Utah Supreme Court has dealt with these merger issues in several 
cases. In the case of State v. Finlayson, 994 P.2d 1243 (Utah 2000), the court was 
presented with a defendant that was convicted of both robbery and kidnapping. 
The factual situation of that case established that the defendant met the victim, 
and they decided to study together. They went to the defendant's home, and 
eventually the defendant tried to kiss the victim and was rebuffed. The defendant 
1UCA § 76-2-103(4)With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he ought to be 
aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result 
will occur. The risk must be of a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
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then picked up the victim, carried her to his bedroom, and proceeded to rape the 
victim. The remaining facts are critical and are described by the Court as follows: 
After the assault, the victim tried to leave defendant's apartment, 
but was made to wait ten minutes while defendant dressed. While 
leaving the apartment, defendant tried to put a paper bag over the 
victim's head so she would not see his address. When she refused to 
wear the bag, defendant placed a jacket over her head. The drive to 
the victim's apartment lasted one hour, despite the fact that she 
lived less than thirty minutes away. When the victim stated that she 
wanted to die, defendant refused to take her home until she 
promised not to harm herself. (Id. at 1245) 
The defendant was charged and convicted of Rape, Forcible Sodomy and 
Aggravated Kidnapping. The Utah Supreme Court reversed the defendant's 
conviction for Aggravated Kidnapping under the theory of merger. In that case 
the Court held: 
To prevent double punishment for essentially the same act, Couch 
established a test for determining when a defendant's kidnapping 
conviction is sustainable in addition to his sexual assault 
convictions. To sustain convictions for both kidnapping and sexual 
assault, the prosecutor must show that the kidnapping detention was 
longer than the necessary detention involved in the commission of 
the sexual assault. Thus, the facts establishing the kidnapping 
detention must not be merely incidental to the sexual assault, but 
separate and independent therefrom, (citing State v. Couch, 635 
P.2d 89 (Utah 1981)) 
The Court in Finlayson found that although the defendant had forcibly 
detained the victim, including the handcuffing the victim to the bed, this was done 
in furtherance of the rape and sodomy and did not constitute a separate crime of 
kidnapping. The Court stated; 
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Defendant's acts to that point, apart from the rape and forcible 
sodomy, had no independent significance sufficient to support a 
separate conviction for aggravated kidnapping. As we stated in 
Couch, to hold otherwise would transform virtually every rape and 
robbery into a kidnapping as well. (Id. at 1249) 
In a case very similar to the one at bar, the court determined that a DUI 
charge merged with an automobile homicide charge under very similar facts. The 
case of State v. Avila, 2006 UT App 71, f^ 9 131 P.3d 864 is a recent decision that 
shows the fairness of combining similar charges. In Avila, the defendant rolled his 
pickup truck killing his wife and unborn child and seriously injuring himself and 
his two children. Based on a blood draw taken just after the accident, defendant's 
blood alcohol concentration was over the legal limit. Specifically, the test results 
of the blood draw put defendant's blood alcohol concentration at .240 - three 
times the legal limit. All of the elements of DUI had to be proven to establish 
automobile homicide. This Court reasoned that the conclusion that the defendant 
was facing double jeopardy appeared so obvious that trial counsel should have 
requested that the two offenses be consolidated. The Court reversed the 
defendant's conviction and further held that defendant's counsel was ineffective 
for failing to seek consolidation of the charges pursuant to the merger doctrine in 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402. 
The merger doctrine has been invoked by the Supreme Court of Utah in an 
inverse application in the case of State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152 (Utah 1983). In 
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that case, the defendant broke into a gas station where he was previously 
employed with the motive of stealing money from the cash register. The police 
were called and found that a desk drawer lock had been broken, and the contents 
scattered around the station. The owner returned to open the gas station, heard a 
loud noise, and defendant was discovered hiding in the storage closet. He was 
subsequently convicted of burglary, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202(1) 
(1953). On appeal, the Court affirmed the conviction and held that defendant was 
not entitled to an instruction on criminal trespass, a lesser included offense of 
burglary, because he did not point to any evidence in the record which went to the 
specific intent elements of criminal trespass. The court held that under Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-202(1), a lesser included offense instruction would have been 
required only if the evidence was prone to alternative interpretations. This 
alternate interpretation would require a rational basis for an acquittal of defendant 
on the offense charged as well as a rational basis for convicting him of the lesser 
included offense. The Court held that the defendant's argument went only to the 
sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of burglary, but failed to address the 
separate and distinct intent elements necessary for criminal trespass. The Court 
stated: 
Both the legal elements and the actual evidence or inferences needed 
to demonstrate those elements must necessarily be included within 
the original charged offense...(but) when the two charges are such 
that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily having 
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committed the lesser, then as a matter of law they stand in the 
relationship of greater and lesser offenses, and the defendant cannot 
be convicted or punished for both. Baker at 156. 
In State v. Hill, 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court 
created a two part test for identifying whether a conviction for a second offense 
arising out of the same set of facts violates section UCA §76-1-402(3), requiring 
a comparison of "the statutory elements of the two crimes [first] as a theoretical 
matter and [second], where necessary, by reference to the facts proved at trial." 
(Id. at 97 emphasis added) 
The issues in the present case meet both parts of the two part test outlined 
in Hill. The main provision of the failure to respond to an officer's signal charge 
is identical to the primary element of automobile homicide. The provision reads 
"An operator who violates Subsection (1) and while so doing causes death or 
serious bodily injury to another person, under circumstances not amounting to 
murder or aggravated murder, is guilty of a felony of the second degree." UCA § 
41-6a-210. The Automobile Homicide statute reads, "Criminal homicide is 
automobile homicide if the person operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner 
causing the death of another." In essence, in the facts of this particular case one 
cannot commit the crime of failure to respond to an officer's signal at the level of 
a second-degree felony without also committing automobile homicide. It 
statutorily encompasses the exact same behavior. 
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The second prong of the Hill test was likewise met because the facts 
proven at trial by the prosecution ultimately established that the elements of 
automobile homicide and failure to stop are the same. It was proven in trial that 
Mr. Bustos caused an accident where two people lost their lives. (R. 280/131). 
Several police officers testified that Mr. Bustos failed to stop for the various 
signals given by Officer Jones while he was being chased. (R. 280/125-131). It is 
precisely the speeding and running red lights in an attempt to flee from the officer 
that constituted the criminally negligent element of the criminal homicide statute. 
As a result of this criminally negligent behavior by the defendant in running from 
Officer Jones, two people died. This is not in dispute. However, what is in dispute 
is the propriety of charging the Defendant with both automobile homicide, a 
second-degree felony, and failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop, a 
second-degree felony. It is undisputed that both charges are based on the same 
two facts; the criminal negligence in running from the police and the fact that two 
people were killed as a result of this negligence. 
Similarly, in the present case the State could not prove that the Defendant 
failed to respond to the signal of an officer as a second degree felony without also 
proving that the Defendant committed automobile homicide . Typically, failure to 
respond to an officer's signal is a third-degree felony. However, the enhancement 
It was undisputed that the third element of the automobile homicide (i.e. under 
the influence of drugs) was present. 
18 
provision (causing death or bodily injury) makes the charge identical to 
automobile homicide. That is the only element required to make failure to 
respond a second-degree felony. It is also the main requirement of automobile 
homicide. Since the elements are virtually identical, the merger doctrine should 
apply and the lesser charge of failure to respond to an officer's signal should be 
dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the error of not merging the two charges 
together was in contravention to clearly established statutory law and violated the 
Defendant's rights, resulting in a conviction that does not meet the standards 
required by this Court. The effect of not applying the merger doctrine in this case 
can only be cured by a reversal of the felony failure to respond to an officer 
signal. 
DATED this 22nd day of July 2009. ^ ^ 
RANDALL W. RICHARDS 
Attorney for Appellant 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - gZKgQSS tlSTKlCT CG'JM 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF IjTAH MAY 1 0 Z007 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s 
EDDIE RAYMOND BUSTOS, 
D e f e n d a n t 
MINUTES 
HEARING / APP SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 051906366 FS 
Judge: PAMELA G. HEFFERNAN 
Date: May 8, 2007 
PRESENT 
Clerk: roxanneb 
Prosecutor: DAINES, WILLIAM F 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RYAN BUSHELL, PDA 
Agency: Adult Probation and Parole 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: June 21, 1957 
Video 
Tape Number: PGH0 50 8 07 Tape Count: 13 5, 2 05 
CHARGES 
POLIC 2. FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT COMMAND OF 
Plea: Not Guilty 
3. AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE 
Plea: Not Guilty 
4. AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty 
2nd Degree 
Guilty Disposition: 03/29/2007 
2nd Degree Felony 
Disposition: 03/29/2007 Guilty 
Disposition: 03/29/2007 Guilty 
Felony 
HEARING 
This is the time set for hearing on a Motion to Arrest Judgment. 
Defendant is present in custody from the Weber County Jail. 
Defendant is represented by Ryan Bushell. 
The Court hears argument on the motion and denies the motion. 
COUNT: 2:05 
Case recalled. The Court hears from the victim's mother (Jessica; 
Mr. Daines reads a statement from Marvin Ellis. The Court hears 
from the defendant. 
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The Court proceeds with sentencing. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO STOP/RESPOND AT 
COMMAND OF POLIC a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to 
an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than 
fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE a 2nd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The Court orders sentence imposed on count 1 to run concurrent with 
the other counts. Sentence on counts 2 and 3 shall run consecutive 
to each other. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court recommends defendant pay restitution of $14,000 as a 
condition of parole. The Court also recommends defendant receive 
credit for time served since 03/29/07 
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D a t e d t h i s day of MAY ^ 2007 
PAPteE&^r. HEFFERNAN 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t Judge 
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